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oranges, and pears, so that in time it would doubtless have become a generic name for fruit. Now if the chance expressions of a child, in civilized society, may obtain temporary currency within a limited range, far more likely was this to have been the case with the casual ejaculations of the primitive language-maker. Thousands of words might arise, like this *puttaba*, for which it would be impossible to assign any adequate reason. Accidental we call them, only because the circumstances which determine the production of one sound rather than another lie beyond the reach of our present means of investigation. Mr. Tylor has shown (*Fortnightly Review*, Vol. IV. p. 549) that the character of the emitted sound will, to a certain extent, depend upon the expression of the face at the moment of utterance, since the play of expression alters the contour of the vocal cavity. This opens a very deep vein of inquiry, but it is one which must be worked by the physiologist. We have here reached an ultimate stratum where neither Grimm's Law nor any other implement of philological research can help us; and here we may be content for the present to let the inquiry rest.

JOHN FISKE.

ART. II.—1. *Essay on Language, and other Papers.* By ROWLAND G. HAZARD. Edited by E. P. PEABODY: Boston: Phillips, Sampson, & Co. 1857.

2. *Our Resources.* New York: Charles Scribner & Co. 1868.

3. *Finance and Hours of Labor.* New York: Charles Scribner & Co. 1868.

4. *Freedom of Mind in Willing; or, Every Being that wills, a Creative First Cause.* New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1864.

5. *Two Letters, on Causation, and Freedom in Willing, addressed to John Stuart Mill. With an Appendix on the Existence of Matter, and our Notions of Infinite Space.* By ROWLAND G. HAZARD. Boston: Lee and Shepard. 1869.

THE foregoing list comprises the most important productions of an American author who, without the advantage of a college

training, and engaged from early life in an extensive manufacturing and mercantile business, which has allowed but limited opportunities for reading, has nevertheless written with extraordinary ability upon the grave and often perplexing problems of economical and metaphysical science. Of the earliest of his published writings, the "Essay on Language," Channing thus speaks in his lecture on Self-Culture: "I have known a man of vigorous intellect, who had enjoyed few advantages of early education, and whose mind was almost engrossed by the details of an extensive business, who composed a book, of much original thought, in steamboats and on horseback, while visiting distant customers." His later writings, on topics of finance and philosophy, have elicited strong expressions of appreciation and respect from one of the most distinguished of living authors in the same departments of inquiry,—John Stuart Mill. That Mr. Hazard, under such disadvantages, should be able to take hold of the questions which he has handled, with so clear an understanding of their nature and their present aspects, shows how much may be caught up from the atmosphere of thought that surrounds us. Yet these discussions would have been impossible, had not the author, besides this quickness of observation, been endowed by nature with philosophical talents of a very high order. A singular delicacy of analysis is combined with a strong grasp of the main points at issue, and a striking originality both in argument and illustration. A predilection for mathematics and mathematical reasoning is frequently manifest; but this does not exclude an equal sympathy with the higher forms of literature. We propose in the following pages to give some account of the various writings of Mr. Hazard, and to couple with it occasional criticisms upon their contents.

What Mr. Hazard has written upon the subject of Political Economy has been in the form of newspaper essays or tracts for the times, having reference to special topics of immediate practical importance. But these essays discover a profound comprehension of the principles of the science, and uncommon skill in the elucidation of them. It is a significant fact that, though engaged, as we have said, from early life in business as a manufacturer, Mr. Hazard, without reading Adam Smith or

any of the other writers in this province of knowledge, but simply through his own reflections, is an anti-protectionist. We advert to this circumstance, not as affording evidence of the truth or falsehood of either position in this controversy, but merely with reference to the observation, which is frequently heard, that the advocates of free-trade are inexperienced, unpractical theorists. They are stigmatized in the leading journals, which defend the protectionist policy, as professors, schoolmasters, and speculators. This argument — more a sneer than an argument — appeals to a vulgar, unfounded prejudice, which holds in low esteem abstract reasoning and philosophical thought respecting matters of practical concern. It comes with ill grace from those who have been contending for years, on grounds of abstract morality and political justice, against the institution of slavery, the champions of which were always ready with their imposing array of facts and figures. Whether a practical familiarity with business gives special value to a man's opinions on financial questions, depends wholly on the powers of analysis and generalization which he carries with him into practical affairs, and which alone enable him to turn his experience to profitable account as regards the advancement of science.

“Our Resources” is a collection of articles published by Mr. Hazard during our late war. Early in the struggle there was great apprehension that, with the destruction of our foreign credit, our resources would prove inadequate to the emergency. These essays were designed to establish the faith of the public, here and abroad, in the sufficiency of our means. They originally appeared in the newspapers, but were collected into a pamphlet, which passed through repeated editions in this country and England. Abbreviated translations of them were also circulated on the Continent. They showed that the *spare* income of the nation prior to the war was \$1,000,000,000 (gold value), and that from the stimulus imparted to labor by the war itself, and from the improvement in agricultural machinery, there was no reason to fear a diminution of this surplus; further, that from the standard of living prevalent among all classes in this country, \$500,000,000 might be saved without stretching economy to a point involving any real hardship. They showed, also, that,

while the great expenditures in the war, the prostration of the credit of individuals and of banks, and the withdrawing of coin, required a considerable emission of paper-currency, yet any expansion beyond the limit of this requirement would increase the cost of the war, and enhance the debt to be subsequently paid in gold, with no counterbalancing advantages, since the increase in the volume of paper-money would add nothing to its aggregate value or purchasing power. The warning which was given in these able papers it would have been well to heed. One of the essays, entitled "Compensation to Slaveholders," undertakes to demonstrate that the value of land alone in a free State is equal to the combined value of land and of the slaves required to cultivate it in a slave State. This argument yields a picture full of encouragement to the South, since facts already indicate that it will be verified by the practical test.

The last article of this series appeared at a very critical epoch in the financial affairs of the country. The treasury was depleted; gold was at 280; money was scarce, and the bonds of the government unsalable. The incoming Secretary of the Treasury was advised in advance by bankers and financiers that his only resource was to issue more currency, that there might be a plentiful supply of money wherewith to buy the bonds. Mr. Hazard in this paper asserted — what in the light of subsequent experience is now obvious — that the course recommended to the Secretary would lead directly and speedily to national bankruptcy, and that it would, if adopted, produce a depreciation of the currency which it would be impossible to arrest, and that our financial fate would be the same as that which befell the Southern Confederacy. This article of Mr. Hazard was entitled "Expansion and Contraction." It explained how the effect of expansion must be to make money scarce and prevent the sale of the bonds; while the policy of contraction, if avowed, and adhered to, would restore confidence, and release money from the uses of trade and the appliances of speculation, to be invested in government securities. The proposition was generally regarded as preposterous, but the arguments by which it was supported were found, on examination, convincing, and the doctrines of this brief essay are among the recognized truths of political economy. The Secretary of the Treasury was fortu

nately convinced that these positions were well taken ; and if the policy of contraction, which the author advised, was not pursued, no further expansion was attempted. The public are not generally aware how near we were, at that time, to measures which would have inevitably brought upon us financial ruin.

The second series of Mr. Hazard's financial papers bears the title, "Finance and Hours of Labor." The special topics are, "Finance," "Hours of Labor," "Payment of the Five-Twenty Bonds," "Inflated Currency," "How to resume Specie Payments," "Reconstruction — Freedmen's Bureau." The impolitic as well as iniquitous character of all schemes of repudiating the national debt is impressively proved. One of the capital merits of these essays is the proof which they present, as to the peculiar evils, both of repudiation and of an inflated currency, to farmers and laborers, the classes whom demagogues especially endeavor to mislead on this point. Another excellence is in the unanswerable reasoning by which the fallacious nature of all devices for resuming specie payments without diminishing the volume of the currency is demonstrated. In the course of a reply to an advocate of one of these plausible, but mistaken plans, Mr. Hazard observes : " His whole argument still ignores the fact that the purchasing power of the whole volume of currency cannot be increased by increasing its quantity ; that if you double or tenfold it, double or tenfold the amount will be required to pay for the same quantity of labor or property. With the recognition of this, his whole fabric crumbles " — and, Mr. Hazard might have added, many like fabrics of modern alchemists, who by some legerdemain would transmute paper into gold.

The earliest of Mr. Hazard's published writings is the " Essay on Language," which stands first in the collection of his briefer literary and philosophical discussions. In that essay he attempts to define the essential characteristics of the language of poetry. It is not easy to give a definition, at once accurate and comprehensive, of poetry ; as the fate of many past experiments evinces. Even the definition given, in Molière, to Mons. Jourdain by his master, which borrows its humor from its supposed axiomatic character, is a failure, since the antithesis of poetry, according to Coleridge's well-known dictum, is not

prose, but science. Aristotle and the ancients, in styling poetry an imitative art, were not so far astray as some modern critics have charged, since under imitation they included the reproduction of experiences not actual, but made real by the living power of the imagination. Milton's epithets, — "simple, sensuous, passionate," — are a striking description of the qualities of poetry; and Lord Bacon's fine expression as to the office of poetry in "submitting the shows of things to the desires of the mind," has had its just applause. If we add the suggestions of Coleridge and Wordsworth, as, that poetry always springs from an excited state of the faculties, that a poem uniformly has pleasure for its immediate end, and that to this pleasure not the whole alone, but each of its constituent parts also, must minister, we advance still farther towards a solution of the problem. Mr. Hazard begins by calling attention to the fact that thought and language are not inseparable. There is an incipient stage of our thoughts when they are not connected with words. Thoughts, as long as they are in this stage, he designates primitive perceptions. Words are the signs of thought, and the instruments of communicating it. We may, as far as practicable, dismiss the ideals or primitive perceptions, and, directing our attention exclusively to terms, by means of them carry forward intellectual processes. Mathematical analysis affords the purest example of this use of the *language of abstraction*. This is the characteristic language of unpoetic composition; it is the language of science. On the other hand, our attention may be fastened directly on the ideals or primitive perceptions, and their relations to one another; and this is a poetic mode of mind. These relations are not examined through substituted terms, but immediately. Moreover, "poetry, depending on this prominence of the primitive perceptions, must present, or at least use for illustration, such as we perceive clearly or feel strongly; and hence its intimate and essential connection with imagery and with passion." Language does not stand as the conventional equivalent for thought, and substitute for it. The thoughts and emotions which the language of poetry excites are its *effect*. The poet uses language "to induce an ideal," and avails himself of the association between the ideals themselves. "With a cabalistic

word he summons the half-recognized ghosts of departed feelings, and with the incantation of terms invokes a host of spirits from the world of fancy. And though we do not recollect the words, and cannot repeat the terms in that order which alone gives them magic power, yet the spectral or fairy forms, the impressions, the emotions, in short, the ideals they created, may be as distinctly retained as the remembrance of any external object which we have seen without learning its name." Thus poetry can reach beyond the limits of precise terms, and by its wondrous art reach to remote ideals, beyond such as are within the immediate grasp of words. The modes of abstraction and of ideality are thus directly opposed to one another. Between them lies the intermediate language of narration; but with narration ideality may blend, when the language of prose becomes interfused with the spirit and diction of poetry. Ideality mingles with abstraction in all effective oratory. Ideality is the life of eloquence. Abstraction may persuade, but it is ideality that inspires conviction. "It warms the heart and gives an impulse like that which arises from the realities which it depicts, for it makes them present to our mind's sight, and corresponding effects are produced upon us." Ideality impresses the mind of the auditor, without any conscious effort on his part; wholly without the labor requisite to follow a process of reasoning.

Having set forth the distinction between ideality and abstraction, the essay deduces an interesting train of reflections. One of the topics is the language of futurity. It is suggested that the future life may introduce a method of communion between mind and mind, which dispenses with words and signs, — a consummation of which the magic influence of poetry, as a revealer of thought, seems prophetic. In that case, thought will be communicated without any medium "to distort its meaning or sully its brightness." The power of music in awakening emotion is even more subtle and inexplicable than that of poetry, with which it is intimately allied. The effect of music is a series of excitements, "an induced activity to which the soul is wrought without any conscious effort of its own." But we may suppose music divested of sounds. The composer of music must have the emotions independently of the sounds,

as the poet creates his ideals independently of the terms. It is conceivable, then, that these emotions should be immediately imparted to the mind, without the necessity of the sounds by which they are evoked; and this may be the fact in another state of being. By a very delicate and penetrating analysis, the author discovers the secret bond that unites poetry, love, music, and devotion. In a fine and elevated strain, he explains the influence of ideality on character. The brief passages which follow will afford an idea of the style in which the discussion is carried forward: —

“In the formation of character, ideality exerts an influence of the highest importance. It is the channel by which the conceivable objects of desire or aversion are brought nearest to the springs of voluntary action. From those supposable events which are continually flowing through the mind, we form rules of conduct, or receive impressions, which imperceptibly govern us in the concerns of real life. It is in meditation that we nurture those innate feelings which give impulse to action, and determine its mode. He who accustoms himself to this discipline, who withdraws from the bustle of the world, and in tranquillity contemplates imaginary cases, and determines how he ought to act under them, frames for himself a system of government with less liability to error than he can do in the tumultuous scenes of active life.”

“That we can modify our dispositions, is perhaps sufficiently obvious, though too often overlooked in its practical application. The great means by which these modifications are effected, we believe to be processes of ideality, and the principal causes of the wrong formation of character are, the perversion of these processes to foster ignoble passions, and the want of their influence in counteracting the effects of external causes. Fortunately, the occasions of life which have a tendency to warp the disposition, though frequent, have their intervals, are transient, and in some degree neutralize each other. The forms of ideality may always be brought to mind, and, if we encourage the presence of those only which are pure and elevated, we shall, as a consequence, become more and more refined and ennobled. Without this countervailing principle, our moral nature would be the sport of chance, liable to be irretrievably driven from its course by every current of feeling and every storm of passion. Character would then depend on accidental and physical causes.”

“We have already spoken of the power of ideality in enabling us to fall into the same channels of thought which our acquaintances would pursue. If we mistake not, this is particularly obvious in the application

of it which we are now considering. How often, when we have determined on a course of conduct, particularly when that determination is formed under the influence of exciting circumstances, are we led to suspect the propriety of it, by thinking how some friend would view it! We put ourselves in his position, look at it calmly as he would do, endeavor to get the same aspect as would be presented to him, and then perhaps discover that our own vision had been distorted, and led us into error. In this way, through the medium of this faculty, we make the virtue and discretion of our friends available to us. We use their modes of thought to mould our own."

Psychological observations on the subject of inspiration and prophecy, which throw light on religious phenomena generally considered inexplicable, form one of the most interesting features of the essay. The two leading functions of the mind, the intuitive and the abstractive, the poetic and the scientific, are considered in their fundamental character, their separate agencies, and mutual relations. We subjoin a few paragraphs as additional illustrations of the character of the discussion:—

"We need not urge that this power of ideality, by which we revive the past, brighten the present, and anticipate the future, is the highest endowment of humanity. It is also that attribute of the finite spirit which most nearly corresponds to that of omnipresence in the infinite. By the exercise of this faculty, every place and every object of its knowledge is made present to the mind; and, if it be not equally proper to say that mind is present to them, this power furnishes an equivalent, which in effect makes mind not omnipresent because, and only because, it is not omniscient and omnipotent. For, if we knew all things, we could make them all present to us in the form of ideals; and, if there were no limit to this power, we could embrace them all at once; and this would be equivalent to being everywhere present at the same time; or, if we may so express it, mind, as manifested in man, has a *finite presence*, which has the same relation to *omnipresence* which its finite knowledge and power have to the other two great attributes of the universal intelligence."

"To elicit the emotions in a happy manner requires a knowledge, not only of the niceties of language, but of the intricate and delicate relations of the feelings, united to a discriminating taste, which neither perplexes by obscurity, nor wearies attention by prolixity, nor offends the vanity by being too minute. The poet must frequently give only the prominent ideals, and leave the imagination to supply the rest. The reader will thus have his faculties more excited, and fill up the blanks in a

manner most agreeable to himself; and, revelling in what thus seem the creations of his own fancy, he will cheerfully award the meed of praise to that which has provoked him to thought, and imparted to him the elevation of conscious power. We may here remark that a little obscurity in expression, or ambiguity in terms, when so employed as to concentrate rather than distract attention, may greatly assist this effect, and, at the same time, repel the attention from the terms to the ideals, to which they allow a greater latitude, but may still, in some measure, control."

"Although the poetic and prosaic modes of mind are seldom found united in their highest perfection in the same individual, yet every aspect of the subject indicates that it is by a combination of them that the greatest intellectual power is produced. It is then the union of activity and strength, — the beauty of poetry mingling its vivacity and softness with the sterner and stronger attributes of reason. So necessary does this combination appear, in order to give efficiency to talent, that we think we should hazard little in asserting that every great enterprise in philosophy had been accomplished by a powerful imagination, controlled and directed by yet more powerful reasoning faculties; and that every grand achievement in poetry had been effected by strong reasoning powers, sustaining and impelling a yet more vigorous imagination. In great minds it is not the absence of either endowment, but only the *predominance* of the reasoning or ideal faculty, which forms the distinction, and determines the character to the one or the other class."

The maturest and most elaborate of the writings of Mr. Hazard is his work on the Will. It was undertaken partly in deference to a request of Channing, who, like many others, appears to have been of Dr. Johnson's mind, that "all theory is against the freedom of the will, all experience in favor of it." Remarks of Mr. Hazard on this subject, especially in reference to Edwards's argument, so impressed Channing, that he urged the preparation of a book in answer to that famous treatise. The work which Channing desired to be written did not see the light until long after the suggestion was made. It was published in 1864. After a brief Preface, which vindicates the dignity and importance of metaphysical studies, the author enters upon an exposition and defence of his system. We proceed to give a summary view of its leading features.

To mind, Mr. Hazard affirms, causal agency pre-eminently, if not exclusively, belongs. Of the existence of matter as a dis-

tinct entity there is no decisive proof. The sensations of which we are conscious, and on which a belief in matter is founded, may be the ideas of God directly imparted to us, the "laws of nature" being a synonyme for the uniform action of the Supreme Intelligence. But, granting the objective reality of matter, we must find all its causal agency in its motion. Its motion has been eternal, or it has been communicated to it from without. It is demonstrable that the causal power exerted in motion would tend to exhaust itself. Hence, if motion has been from eternity, this power is reduced to an infinitesimal. If it commenced with its present conditions, therefore, the interference of an intelligent cause must have been requisite, to sustain any appreciable power in matter as cause. If it commenced with other conditions, a like interference was required to change them to the conditions which now exist. So that the present influence of matter, by means of motion, must result from the action of intelligence. Mind, on the contrary, is possessed of an original, causal agency. Its sensations and emotions are not subject to will. Neither is its knowledge; although by will we can produce the conditions favorable to the acquisition of knowledge. The mind has but one real faculty, or power, to do anything, and this faculty is the *will*. Through this faculty the mind puts forth effort. The object of every act of will is to produce some effect in the future. Its immediate object is to influence mental activity, or to move the body.

Here, then, in the will, is the fountain, and the sole fountain, of the mind's causal agency. And what is liberty? It is the opposite of compulsion, constraint, coercion. The freedom of the will is an expression of the fact that the mind controls its own action, exempt from all constraint. Self-determination is the essence of freedom. Here is a cause which is not moved to act by anything else, but is self-moved. It is true that there are conditions precedent, without which its action is insupposable. These conditions are *want* and *knowledge*. There must be some want of which the mind is sensible, and a preconception of a way or ways in which this want may be satisfied. Without this prophetic power volition would be impossible. But neither the want nor the knowledge, which are the conditions of volition, are endued with efficiency. They are only

occasional causes. It is true that volition does not always follow immediately on the consciousness of a want and the knowledge of the means of supplying it. The mind may deliberate as to whether it will gratify its want, or which of various conflicting wants it will gratify, or what course, out of several which may be open, it will adopt for the purpose of attaining the end. But deliberation is voluntary, and is initiated by an act of will. Whether the mind will seek for more knowledge, prior to putting forth the act of volition, and how much time it will spend in this process of consideration, it is for the will, or the mind willing, to determine. The determination or decision, however, which is termed *choice*, is not an act of will, but purely a perception, — an act of the knowing capacity. This is a prominent feature of Mr. Hazard's system. Having thus attained to the requisite knowledge as to what its want is, and what is the best method of ministering to it, the mind freely puts forth its activity in the form of volition. The will is strictly a creative power, and the mind of man has just the same power in kind as belongs to God. Aside from the act of giving existence to matter, of which we can form no conception, and of which there exists no proof, the creative power of Deity is possessed, though in vastly less measure, by his rational creatures. The knowledge of man is limited, and thus the sphere in which his will can be exercised is proportionately restricted. But the human mind, like the divine, is influenced by its preconceptions of its own effects; it is drawn forward, so to speak, by the future, and thus is truly a first cause.

Matter, being unintelligent and without will, must be controlled in its changes by a power without itself. At least, it has no power to vary the effects of its own motion, on the supposition that motion originally belongs to it. In order to the existence of will, there must be at least one want, with a knowledge of at least one way of supplying it. In the case of instinctive action this knowledge is intuitive. It is furnished to the being without his own action. Hence the element of deliberation is absent. Rational actions are according to a plan which the being who performs them has contrived. Habitual action is the action of a finite, intelligent being, in conformity to a plan of its own, with which practice has made it

so familiar that each successive step is taken without the need of examination. Hence habit is called second nature. The voluntary action of human beings is first instinctive. The basis of it is our innate wants and intuitive knowledge.

Man is capable of modifying his wants by increasing his knowledge. Hence his sentiments are largely, though indirectly, under his control. The knowledge of each individual as to what is morally right is for him infallible. He is responsible only for failing to put forth the efforts which are conformed to his knowledge or sense of right. The persevering effort to be noble and good is, itself, being noble and good. The effort, if it be real, is here the consummation.

Mr. Hazard's system is brought out more fully in the second part of his treatise, which comprises his Review of Edwards. The phraseology of Edwards in defining the will is subjected to a searching criticism. Especially is the propriety of his identification of choice and volition disputed. That Edwards involves himself in ambiguity and inconsistency by making choice, which with him is a synonyme of volition, equivalent to "being pleased, or displeased" with a thing, while in other places the latter state of mind is made the antecedent and ground of the choice, is clearly set forth. The definition of liberty which is given by Edwards is simply a definition of external liberty. He assumes a necessity of connection between the acts of the will and "such moral causes as the strength of inclination, or motive." This inclination may be so strong in one direction, says Edwards, that it is impossible to surmount it. But "inclination" and "bias" are, by his definition, previous choices. His argument for moral necessity generally goes no farther than to prove the incompatibility of two opposite choices at the same time. But if his idea be that the mind cannot overcome its own strong inclination, then, according to Mr. Hazard, this fact, being due to the absence of want or the presence of a conflicting want, is not inconsistent with freedom. The inability to will when or what a man does not want to will, is not opposed to liberty. Edwards's favorite method of confuting his opponents, the advocates of self-determination, is the *reductio ad absurdum*. To their assertion that "one can choose otherwise than he actually chooses, if he will," it is replied, that, as "will"

and "choose" are equivalent terms, their proposition implies that a choice is itself chosen, which leads to an infinite series. But it is one thing to say that "the will determines its own acts *by* choosing its own acts," and quite another thing to say that "the will determines its own acts *in* the exercise of a power of willing and choosing." Edwards confounds the two statements; whereas the latter does not of necessity imply the absurdity of choosing choices, but merely identifies the act of self-determination with the act of choosing. They are one and the same.

The main arguments of Edwards for the doctrine of necessity are found in the application of the maxim, no event without a cause, to the phenomena of the will. Why, in any given case, did the mind choose as it did, and not otherwise? It is not sufficient, says Edwards, to attribute this event to the power of choice, or to the general activity of the mind. What we have to account for is, the specification of the choice,—the choice of one thing *rather* than another. But Edwards solves the problem himself, by one of the modes in which he states it. "Active nature," he says, "is a general thing; it is an ability, or tendency, of nature, to action generally taken, which may be a cause why the soul acts as occasion or reason is given." In regard to this sentence, Mr. Hazard observes: "He virtually admits all that is essential to my system; i. e. that the soul has an ability to action, which it may use when it sees a reason, and that its effort, or act of will, is but an exercise of this *general ability* or power of action, which it directs or determines to some *particular* act by means of its knowledge." The activity of the soul in willing is not prior to the act of willing, but is identical with it. The mind determines and controls itself in the act of will, and is not determined by any power extrinsic to itself: this is its freedom. "If, to the question proposed by Edwards, 'why the soul of man uses its activity as it does,' it should be replied, that intelligence, from its very nature, has a faculty to determine, or to direct its activity, it would be in conformity to his own previous statements, that the mind has a faculty by which it wills, and that an act of volition is a determination of the mind." The whole question really is whether an absolute

cause,—a cause not necessitated to act as it does, but self-moving and self-directed,—is conceivable. Mr. Hazard presents a very ingenious refutation of the argument for necessity derived from the alleged uniformity in the action of the will under like circumstances. Supposing that such a uniformity exists,—that is to say, that the will in the same circumstances will always act in the same way,—there is no warrant for the inference that its action is necessary. The mind may *freely* direct its voluntary action with uniformity, and this uniformity is just as explicable by referring it to liberty as to necessity. For example, if I go from my dwelling to the post-office every day in the year, and each time take a direct and easy way, instead of a circuitous and difficult one, this last circumstance affords no proof that I do not elect the path with perfect freedom. There is no more evidence of necessity, from the uniformity of my action, than if I were occasionally to break up this uniformity by taking the other way. Mr. Hazard denies the truth of the proposition that the same causes in the same circumstances necessarily produce the same effects. If we understand him, he even questions the fact of such a uniformity in voluntary actions as forms the basis of this doctrine. He holds that where there is a reason for selecting one of several objects, but no reason or motive for selecting one of them rather than another, the mind still can put forth its voluntary effort and take one arbitrarily, or frame to itself a perfectly arbitrary rule for the regulation of its action.

One of Edwards's proofs of necessity is drawn from the fact of the foreknowledge of God. Actions which are not determined by antecedent causes, he argues, cannot be foreknown or predicted. The divine government over the world, he contends, would be overthrown on the theory which he opposes. Mr. Hazard meets this argument by admitting that foreknowledge is inseparable from predetermination; but he rejects the inference, holding that foreknowledge is not necessary to the divine administration. The Deity, in the very fact of giving existence to free agents, foregoes the prescience of their voluntary actions; but such are his resources of knowledge and power, that he knows all the possible exertions of free agency on the

part of his creatures, and, as these exertions occur, he can adapt his action accordingly. In short, Mr. Hazard denies that foreknowledge — beyond the foreknowledge of all that is possible — is needful to the conduct of the divine administration and to the realization of the benevolent purposes of God. It is the same ground that was taken by some of the older Socinian theologians. We differ from Mr. Hazard on this point. It cannot be proved that the infallible foreknowledge of free actions is a contradiction. To say that an event infallibly foreknown “must happen,” is ambiguous. There is a logical necessity, indeed, that it should be, but no real necessity, for the plain reason that foreknowledge is not a cause. If we remember an event, it *must* have occurred; but this is not to say that it was a necessitated event. Moreover, nothing is gained to the argument for freedom by the denial of foreknowledge, since every actual event, and thus every free act, was antecedently certain to occur. There is an antecedent certainty, and nothing is lost by allowing that this was known to an intelligent being. If to-day I freely will to make a certain journey, or to give a sum of money to a certain poor man, it was a true proposition yesterday, and from all eternity, that I should to-day thus will. It was a true proposition, whether any being was cognizant of the truth or not. There is nothing to militate against freedom, in foreknowledge, that does not inhere equally in this antecedent certainty which we intuitively see to exist. In truth, there is nothing in either, in themselves considered, that at all affects the question of liberty or necessity.

Mr. Hazard’s correspondence with Mr. Mill relates principally to the subject of causation. With Mr. Mill, cause signifies only the assemblage of antecedents which some event invariably follows. Causal agency, or the exertion of power, in the usual sense of the term, is eliminated, as being something of the existence of which we have no proof. It follows that the distinction of efficient and occasional causes disappears, since efficiency itself has no real existence. Mr. Mill disowns the doctrine of necessity, since this word presupposes a causal agency, which his system does not admit. But he contends for the same invariable sequence in the phenomena of the will as prevails in the operations of material nature. That is to say,

the same mind in the same circumstances always wills in the same way. Respecting the origin of the notion of causation, which Mr. Hazard, with many other philosophers, attributes to our conscious voluntary efforts, producing muscular exertion, Mr. Mill brings forward the argument of Sir William Hamilton, that this cannot be the case, since between the volition, and the motion of the arm, or any other member, there intervene links of cause and effect of which the mind, in the act of will, can have no cognizance. In reply, Mr. Hazard denies that such a cognizance of the intervening process is requisite, inasmuch as the knowledge that the given effect will be produced as a consequence of volition is at first instinctive, and without this innate knowledge the putting forth of such volition would be inconceivable. Mr. Hazard also argues with much force against the general doctrine of Hume and Mill, that causation is identical with invariable sequence, efficiency being excluded. It is asserted that Mr. Mill's definitions seem only to indicate a mode of experimentally finding what are causes, and do not explain or define either our idea or the nature of cause. They do not discriminate between efficient causes and causes which, though necessary to the effect, have no agency in producing it; as life, for example, is the necessary condition of death. The passive agencies which resist a given change are not to be confounded with the active agency which changes them. The fact that men differ from one another in their distinction of the cause, from the mere conditions, of a phenomenon, does not prove that there is no cause, in the sense commonly assigned to the term. "If twenty men attribute a phenomenon to twenty different agencies, it is no indication that it may be properly attributed to the whole twenty agencies combined." This diversity of judgment as to what is the real cause furnishes no scientific ground for combining all the conditions, and deeming them, collectively taken, the cause. We have room for only a brief extract: —

"There must be some power producing the uniformity, the existence of which, in the flow of events, all admit. To meet this necessity of the observed facts, the last hypothesis of our category seems to have been devised. It appears to fully cover the ground intended, for it asserts that the cause inheres, not in the events themselves, but in the invariability or uniformity of their succession. But the very things to be

accounted for by the theory, are, first, the advent, addition, or succession of an event, and second, the observed uniformity in this succession. Under this hypothesis, if it be asked why one certain event succeeds another certain event, it must be replied, because it always does so; i. e. it does so on the particular occasion, because it does so on all other like occasions. And if in any case the cause of this uniformity be asked for, as, for instance, why the consequent B always succeeds the antecedent A, the answer must still be because it always does so; i. e. it always does so because it always does so, or, shorter, it does because it does. Nor will it help the matter to say it not only always has been, but we believe it always will be so. The *generic names* of the phenomena are now superseded by the phrase *always does*, both traceable to the same observed fact of uniformity, and both really making the phenomena in a collective form the causes of themselves individually.

“The idea of causative power is distinct from, and must precede, that of the uniformity of its action or its effect. The power which produces the effect may be wholly independent of any uniformity in its manifestation. It is no less cause the first time it acts, when no uniformity can have obtained; and would be no less cause if it varied its action every time it acted. The two ideas are not only not identical, but are essentially distinct and different.

“From the conclusion which I reached, that the effect is simultaneous with the action of its cause, I have already suggested the corollary, that our idea of cause is independent of, and separable from, that of succession; and if I was correct in saying that the knowledge that we can (through motion of matter or otherwise) extend the effects of any action beyond the moment of exertion is not essential to our idea of power or of cause, we may from this also infer that succession is not a necessary element in our idea of power or of cause; and this position, if tenable, takes away the whole foundation of the definitions of cause which rest upon the mere succession of consequents to antecedents invariable, inevitable, or otherwise.”

Other points which are brought into this controversy on the nature of cause and the origin of our notion of cause, — as, for example, the simultaneousness of effect and cause, — we cannot here notice.

There is one department of the action of the will, which, if it be recognized in this treatise, has less than its due share of attention. There are permanent states of the will, — immanent preferences, — which are properly called principles of

action, inasmuch as they dictate a great variety of overt voluntary actions subordinate to them. In other words, the mind voluntarily sets before itself ends, and the determination of the will towards an end, when once made, may abide as a permanent state of the will, and as the spring of numberless volitions which are put forth as means for the attainment of the end thus previously chosen. Mr. Hazard has a chapter on the "Effort for Internal Change." In the course of it, he observes: "If the object of the effort, instead of external good and noble action, is the direct improvement of his own moral nature, then the persevering effort to be good and noble is, itself, being good and noble." Here the effort—that is, the action of the will—is characterized as "persevering." It is also said: "While in the external there must be something beyond the effort,—i.e. there must be that subsequent change which is the object of the effort, before the creation is consummated,—in the sphere of the moral nature the effort is itself the consummation." These sentences open a path of inquiry which this able writer has not very fully pursued. We may briefly indicate what we conceive to be the truth in the matter. That such a continuous purpose or determination of the will may exist, is a truth familiarly acknowledged. I resolve to go to London. This resolve is a determination of the will, after a consideration, we will suppose, of the reasons for and against the journey. This resolution, once formed, is not, or need not be, renewed. It remains as an abiding condition of the will; and in pursuance of it I arrange my affairs at home, engage my passage, and put forth numberless other volitions, all of which serve merely for the execution of this original and continuous purpose. We believe that we are not wrong in describing the state of mind to which we advert as a voluntary state, a state of the will. Now the mind is capable of setting before itself ends, or cherishing purposes, of a vastly more comprehensive character. This explains the possibility of habits, as well as acts, of the will. The will is not merely a faculty of volitions; it is a faculty of preferences, comprehensive, abiding, and governing in their influence, from which volitions spring. These leading purposes or principles constitute character. To follow out the suggestions of this truth

would lead us too far into the domain of theology. But it may be observed that philosophical theologians, like Augustine and Aquinas and Calvin, have considered themselves to assert in their doctrine of sin the very truth respecting the simplicity of character, which Jesus taught in the declaration, "No man can serve two masters." To live for an end is necessary for a rational, moral being; and this end is either good or evil.

The treatise of Mr. Hazard, in our judgment, assigns to knowledge an undue influence on voluntary action. We are not satisfied that what the author calls choice,—the decision how to act,—belongs to the understanding. This criticism touches one of the prominent features of the system advocated in the work. Suppose a case in which a man is engaged in a struggle with temptation. Reason and moral feeling prompt in one direction; appetite and selfish passion in another. And suppose that the will acts in conformity with the baser impulse. Can it be said that the man beforehand knows that this action is best? We are familiar with the distinction which writers make between the rational and the passionate judgment,—the conviction, on the one hand, that the virtuous action and the satisfaction attending it are best, and the vivid sense, on the other, of the attractiveness of forbidden pleasure. But the question is, does not the mind, as far as the judging-faculty is concerned, decide that the right action is best, and, all things considered, will suit it best? And does it not act in direct opposition to the decision of the understanding? In other words, does the man not know that he is acting foolishly, as well as culpably? He is, in fact, choosing an immediate gratification for one more remote and enduring, a gratification of a low species for a refined and elevated enjoyment. The motive to this unworthy act is not to be found within the sphere of the intellect or reason. If there is a more intense excitement of certain lower propensities, and if this vivid conception of the pleasure to be derived from indulging them *occasions* the wrong act of the will, still this condition of feeling is not to be confounded with an act of judgment. There is simply a choice—a choice *by the will*—of an inferior good, which the mind knows to be inferior; and for this choice no sufficient reason is to be given. If there were, the act would

not be morally wrong. We can point out the occasions, or antecedent states of feeling, which are likely to lead to, or be followed by, such an act; but here our explication must end, unless we would call evil good.

The Greek philosophers, without exception, exaggerated the influence exercised by knowledge over character. One pervading error of their systems was this one-sided intellectualism, which even identified knowledge and virtue. This is the verdict of scholars generally, and has been stated by none more explicitly, even in reference to the Socratic system, than by Mr. Grote, the historian. An increase of knowledge may tend to an increase of virtue; but it is a part of the mystery of our free and responsible nature that we can, and often do, act in direct contravention of our clearest perceptions. Ignorance may mitigate, and in some cases obliterate, guilt. "They know not what they do," is an argument for forgiveness. But it is not true that knowledge invariably produces rectitude. Rather is it true that the will and affections may, and in unrighteous action do, reject the control of intelligence.

In perusing Mr. Hazard's treatise, we have carefully looked for his opinion in regard to the power of contrary choice. Has the mind the power to choose otherwise than it actually does choose, without any change of circumstances? That this power is essential to the freedom of the will has been a prevalent opinion of philosophers. It is true that philosophical theologians in great number, — Augustinians, Thomists, Calvinists, Jansenists, — deny the existence of such a power within the sphere of strictly religious action, in the present moral condition of mankind; that is, they deny to "the fallen will" the power to reverse its own fundamental action. The will remains, — such is the doctrine, — and men sin spontaneously, and in this sense freely; but the will is not free to that which is good; on the contrary, it is a will in bondage. But the most orthodox of these theologians maintain an original power of contrary choice as an essential condition of man's first probation, and they hold to the present existence of such a power in respect to that vast category of human actions which do not fall within the distinctively religious sphere. Such a "power to the contrary" appears to be essential to moral liberty. "I

could have willed otherwise," is a bitter ingredient of remorse. In several passages Mr. Hazard seems to concede the reality of the power to the contrary. Speaking of a wrong-doer, he says (p. 166): "He must have been able to will rightly, for his knowledge, which is the only limit to this ability, embraced all that was essential to action morally right." We read also (p. 306): "God never permits such action without a monition through the moral sense, warning us to refrain from the mutilation or degradation of our being, and suggesting search of that knowledge which, by a faith in the wisdom and goodness of the Supreme Intelligence, intuitive or early acquired, we know will reconcile gratification and duty." These passages seem to imply that there was power fully adequate, in the first case, to an opposite determination of the will, and, in the second case, to another determination in the room of the one actually taking place, — another which would have resulted in an opposite one. On the other hand, there are various passages which make the connection between volition and want, or knowledge, or both, to be of such a nature that the power to an opposite act of will seems to be precluded. We read (p. 227): "The inability to will what or when he does not want to will, is not opposed to freedom. Such ideas of freedom are absurd and contradictory." The context may possibly render this passage indecisive as to the point in question. We find, however (on p. 382), the following statement: "The fallacy of the argument . . . lies in supposing that after the mind has, by a decision or judgment, directed its volition or effort, freedom still requires that *some other* volition or effort should be possible." "If there is of *necessity* a connection between this decision and effort, this only proves that the mind is of necessity free in such effort." Now the want and the knowledge are, in the first instance, innate; and then, if we understand our author aright, a volition opposite to the one that actually occurred would have been impossible. At least, the possibility of such an opposite volition is not necessary to freedom. The mind, it is held, on the occasion of its want and knowledge, puts forth of itself its volitive energy. But is not the particular mode of voluntary action, after all, a necessary effect of the constitution of the mind? In other words, is not the mind

constrained, not *ab extra*, but by its nature, to will as it does, — its want and knowledge, which by the supposition are involuntary, being what they are? And is this freedom? Is it freedom on which moral accountableness can be founded? The admission of a power of contrary choice does not of necessity involve a denial of the uniformity of action as a fact. The author's reasonings elsewhere, where he treats of this last topic, make the truth of this statement evident. It might be supposed that room is given for the power of contrary choice, in cases where the mind deliberates for the purpose of increasing its knowledge, either as to the want which it should gratify or the best means of attaining a chosen end. But as far as acts of will enter into this process of reflection, whether in initiating it or breaking it off, they are subject to the same conditions as all other acts of will. They result from a want and from a knowledge, and take place therefore, we infer, with no more possibility of the opposite volition than exists elsewhere. Yet it might be argued that our author's positions, respecting the uniformity of action, the fact of which he questions, and respecting the power to put forth volition arbitrarily in the absence of a motive to a particular form of choice, better harmonize with the supposition that a "power to the contrary" inheres in the will.

From the most recent publication of Mr. Hazard, we find that the impression as to his views on the "power to the contrary," which we had derived from his treatise, is correct. That is to say, he does not admit its existence, and he argues that it is not requisite for freedom. "Our freedom in willing," he says (p. 133), "is evinced by our willing to do what we want to do, and it cannot be necessary to this freedom that we should be able even to try to do what we do not want to try to do." Want, according to our author, is not an act of will, — it is involuntary. If now we *cannot* will except in accordance with the want, is there freedom? Is not the act of the will a necessary result of the constitution of the willing agent, — as truly so, though in a different way, as the want itself? Is there responsibility, when we cannot avoid having the want, and cannot avoid willing in conformity with it? Mr Hazard says: —

“As against Sir William Hamilton’s inferring freedom directly from consciousness, you say, ‘To be conscious of free will must mean to be conscious, before I have decided, that I am able to decide either way.’ I would say, that to be conscious of free will must mean to be conscious, before I have decided, that it is I that am to decide; that I am to determine my own act of will at my own pleasure, or as on examination I shall find will suit me best. The case you state, whether one will prefer to murder or not to murder, does not raise the question of freedom in willing, but only of preferring, or choosing, which, though heretofore held to be the same as willing, you agree with me is something entirely different. The willing to murder is just as free as the willing not to murder, and the only question touching the freedom of the willing is the same in either case; namely, Does the being as he is, good or bad, himself determine to make the effort to murder or not to make it? Whether he determine to make, or not to make, may indicate what his character is, but has no bearing upon the question of his freedom.”

Consciousness of free will is thus identified with the consciousness that I am to put forth an act of will conformably to an intellectual act in regard to which I am not free. This intellectual act being what it is, I cannot will otherwise. Does this conception of freedom furnish an adequate ground of moral accountableness? Does not the mind, in this whole process, conform to a law of its being from which it would be impossible for it to deviate? If it be said that this determination or decision, which precedes the act of will, is itself due indirectly to prior acts of the will, the reply is, that these also can be followed back to a primary decision of the same nature. There is no break in the chain. Is it not more reasonable to regard the determination or decision, in the case supposed, as itself a voluntary act? And does it not imply a deeper, underlying, voluntary preference of something opposed to the highest good, — an immanent habit of will?

In this account of Mr. Hazard’s treatise we have done less than justice to its merits. The subtle and original trains of argumentation which are pursued are hardly more remarkable than the fresh and striking illustrations by which the author’s doctrines are explained and enforced. One great idea, — that the mind itself is capable of originating action, of beginning effort in the absence of all other causative power or

force,— pervades the entire discussion. This idea is set forth as the prime characteristic of freedom, and is defended against various forms of necessitarian objection with an ingenuity rarely surpassed. The admiration which the ability of Mr. Hazard's writings has excited is by no means limited to those who coincide with his philosophical opinions. The "Two Letters on Causation and Freedom in Willing," which are addressed to Mr. Mill, and which have just been given to the public in a revised form, are sufficient of themselves to entitle the author to a place in the front rank of metaphysical writers.

GEORGE P. FISHER.

ART. III. — INDIAN MIGRATIONS.

IN this article I intend to present such evidence bearing upon the migrations of the North American Indians as may be drawn from a consideration of physical conditions, especially the influence of abundant means of subsistence; and, in a second and concluding article, such other evidence upon the same subject as may be derived from their systems of consanguinity, their relative positions, languages, and traditions, and in addition, notices of such actual migrations as are known to have occurred. A determination of the probable source of the aboriginal inhabitants of South America will be involved in the general conclusions I seek to establish.

Since the materials we now possess are insufficient for a conclusive discussion of this subject, some of the views presented will be necessarily conjectural. But as philosophical speculations precede systems of philosophy, so historical speculations often lead the way to veritable history. In the present state of our knowledge, the great movements of the American aborigines in pre-historic ages still lie within the domain of speculation. A probable hypothesis with respect to the initial point of these migrations is the utmost we may hope at present to reach.

It will be my principal object to bring together a body of facts, bearing upon these migrations, which tend to establish